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SYNOPSIS During construction of a new wharf facility in Portland, Maine, an underwater slope 
failed during dredging and subsequent driving of piles through the s·lope. The construction and 
failure of the slope are described. The major factors which contributed to the failure were: 
1) high sensitivity of the silty clay, 2) placement of riprap on the crest of the slope to 4 to 6 ft 
above the design elevation, 3) method of dredging which caused high shear stresses and probable 
disturbed zones near the toe of the slope, 4) dredging slope steeper than design slope, 5) pile 
driving causing localized disturbed zones with low strength around the piles, and 6) sequence of 
dredging and pile driving. 
INTRODUCTION · 
During construction of the Merrill Marine 
Terminal facility in Portland, Maine, a dredged 
slope failed during the dredging and subsequent 
driving of piles through the slope. The authors 
were engaged to investigate the cause of the 
failure. This paper describes the failure and 
the major factors which contributed to the 
failure. 
SITE AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The Merrill Marine Terminal facility is 
located on the Fore River in Portland, Maine. 
The facility consists of a wharf for shipping 
and receiving bulk cargo and storage areas for 
bulk cargo. The wharf is located on the tidal 
mudflats along the river bank, as shown in 
Fig. 1. As originally designed, the wharf was 
to consist of a 600-ft section and a 300-ft 
section. The slope failure described in this 
paper occurred in the 600-ft section. The 
300-ft wharf was not completed and was elimi-
nated from the project. 
The mudflats landward of the wharf were to be 
filled in and used as a bulk storage area. The 
mudflats are underlain by 40 to 70 ft of very 
soft organic clayey silt and sensitive soft to 
medium stiff silty clay. Wick qrains were 
installed in the area landward of the wharf to 
accelerate the consolidation of the soft silt 
and silty clay under the new fill. 
The wharf was designed as a concrete pile-
supported deck with a steel sheetpile bulkhead 
located at the landward edge of the deck, as 
shown in Fig. 2. The organic silt and silty 
clay outboard of the bulkhead were to be dredged 
on a 2H:lV slope to El -35 MLW. The piles for 
the deck consisted of square prestressed con-
crete piles spaced at 12 ft on-center parallel 
to the bulkhead and 16 ft on-center perpendi-
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cular to the bulkhead. The piles in Rows A, R 
and C were 18 in. square and the piles in 
Rows D, E, F and G were 15 in. square. 
The batter piles and the three rows of vertical 
piles closest to the bulkhead (Rows E, F, and G) 
were driven before the outboard slope was 
dredged. The remaining four rows were driven 
after dredging. The failure in the outboard 
slope occurred during the dredging and sub 
sequent driving of the four outboard rows of 
piles. The construction sequence is described in 
detail below. 
SUBSURFACE SOIL CONDITIONS 
The locations of the borings, performed before 
the failure in the vicinity of the outboard 
slope during the design phase and at the 
beginning of construction, are shown in Fig. 1. 
The results of the borings showed that the sub-
surface soil profile at the site consists of the 
following strata, proceeding downward from the 
ground surface: very soft organic clayey silt, 
soft to medium stiff silty clay, stratified 
silty fine sand and clay, glacial till and 
bedrock. 
The organic clayey silt has a natural water 
content of 50 to 80%, a liquid limit of 60 to 
75%, and a plastic limit of 30 to 40%. It 
contains varying amounts of shell fragments, 
organic matter, and occasional lenses of silty 
fine sand. The undrained shear strength of 
the organic silt in the mud flat areas prior 
to filling was in the range of 150 to 300 psf. 
The silty clay is a glaciomarine deposit with 
a natural water content of 25 to 50%, a liquid 
limit of 25 to 40%, and a plastic limit of 15 
to 25%. It contains occasional thin layers of 
silty fine sand. The upper portion of the clay 
above about El -40 MLW has been preconsolidated 
by desiccation. In general, the natural water 
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content of the silty clay is greater than the 
liquid limit (i.e., liquidity index greater than 
1.0). Figure 3 shows the undrained shear 
strength profile from UU triaxial tests per-
formed during the design phase on silty clay 
samples obtained from the borings in mudflat 
areas throughout the site. The Su/cyv relation-
ship based on the results of CU tests performed 
on the silty clay is also shown. The UU test 
profile shows the silty clay to be overcon-
solidated above about El -40 MLW. Figure 4 
shows the stress-strain curves from the UU 
tests. The curves in general show a peak 
strength at relatively small strains and a sub-
sequent dropoff in strength. Two of the curves 
are relatively flat, but these samples were pro-
bably disturbed during sampling or testing. The 
water contents of these two samples were greater 
than the liquid limit indicating that the curves 
should have been more peaked. The shape of the 
peaked curves along with the high liquidity 
index indicate that the silty clay is very sen-
sitive and is susceptible to significant loss of 
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Fig. 3 Silty Clay Undrained Strength Profile 
From UU Tests Performed During Design 
The frequency of silty fine sand layers in-
creases toward the bottom of the silty clay 
stratum, and, in many areas, the lower 5 to 
15 ft of the stratum consists of stratified 
silty fine sand and clay or predominantly silty 
fine sand. A thin layer of dense gravelly gla-
cial till, typically no more than 5-ft thick, 
overlies the bedrock in some areas and is absent 
in others. 
Along the sheetpile bulkhead for the 600-ft 
wharf, the thickness of organic silt varies from 
about 5 ft near the west end to about 20 ft at 
the east end. The thickness of the silty clay 
ranges from about 35 ft at the west end to about 
50 ft at the east end. The soil profile near 
the middle of the section where the slope 
failure occurred is shown in Fig. 2. 
DESIGN OF OUTBOARD SLOPE 
Stability analyses during the design phase were 
performed assuming a uniform peak shear strength 
of 600 psf for the silty clay and assuming the 
river level at El 0 MLW. The computed factor of 
safety based on this strength was about 1.6. As 
part of the analysis of the failure, the authors 
performed stability analyses for the design 
geometry using the peak shear strength profile 
shown in Fig. 3. The computed factor of safety 
was about 1.8. The unit weights used in the 
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weights used for the design analyses. This dif-
ference and the difference in strength assump-
tions account for the difference in the factors 
of safety. However, in each case, the computed 
peak strength factor of safety was greater than 
1. s. 
CONSTRUCTION SEQUENCE 
The construction of the 600-ft wharf was 
designed to proceed in_ the following steps. In 
each construction step, the work progressed from 
west to east. 
1) Place backfill on mudflats to El 10 MLW from 
the existing shoreline out to about the 
bulkhead line. 
2) Drive sheetpile bulkhead. The bulkhead was 
driven to El -40 MLW from Lines 1 to 24, to 
El -50 from Lines 24 to 44, and to refusal 
from Lines 44 to 51. 
3) Drive batter piles and vertical piles in 
Rows E, F, and G. 
4) Construct cap beam on top of bulkhead and 
deck beams out to Row E (construction joint 
at the middle of top of Pile E). 
5) Excavate organic silt outboard of bulkhead, 
replace with gravel fill, and place riprap 
for crest of outboard slope. 
6) Construct deck to 7.5 ft inboard of Row E. 
7) Dredge slope to El -35 MLW in berthing area 
and El -40 at toe of slope. 
8) Drive piles in Rows A through D. 
9) Construct deck beams to outboard edge of 
deck. 
10) Place gravel filter and riprap on slope and 
at toe. 
11) Complete construction of deck. 
CONSTRUCTION PRIOR TO FAILURE 
Construction of the wharf began in July 1981. 
During construction several changes were made to 
the above construction sequence. The organic 
silt outboard of the bulkhead was not removed 
before the gravel and riprap layers were placed. 
The contractor and engineer anticipated that the 
gravel and riprap would sink into the organic 
silt. However, they did not and, as a result, 
the crest of the outboard slope was at about 
El 5 to 7 MLW rather than the design elevation 
of El 1 MLW. 
The outboard slope was dredged by the following 
method. The berthing space outboard of the 
proposed wharf was first dredged to El -35 MLW 
resulting in a nearly vertical 35-ft-high 
dredged slope. The slope was then trimmed by 
dredging to approximately the design slope of 
2H:lV and the toe was dredged to El -40 MLW. 
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During dredging of the slope at the west end of 
the wharf, the contracter had difficulty in 
dredging the toe to El -40. Material appeared 
to be sloughing from the slope into the excava-
tion. On December 16, 1981, some rotation of 
the Row E piles and cracking at the construction 
joint were observed. The designers felt that 
the pile movement was due to slope movement 
caused by squeezing out of soft soils below 
El -25 or slumping at the toe. The movement was 
considered to be only a local problem. In an 
effort to prevent future movement, the contrac-
tor was instructed to: 
1) Only dredge to El -35 and dredge at a later 
time to El -40 for the riprap key. 
2) Extend deck beam construction joints 5 ft 
past E line so that the pile was rigidly con-
nected to the deck beam. 
After these changes were made, the piles and 
deck beams from Line 1 to 17 and the deck slab 
from Line 1 to 11 were completed. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURE 
After the west portion of the wharf was 
completed, the contractor began dredging the 
slope for the remaining 400 ft of the wharf 
(Lines 18 through 51). The entire slope was 
dredged during the period from January 28, 1982 
to March 11, 1982. On March 8, hairline cracks 
were first noticed in the Row E and F piles from 
Line 29 to Line 51. The cracks were located at 
the top, inboard side of the piles. The 
cracking in the Row E piles became more substan-
tial during March 9-10. On March 11, a 1.5-in. 
gap was observed between the bulkhead and the 
top of the outboard slope. At some of the 
piles, several inches of soil was mounded up 
against the inboard side of the pile, and there 
was a depression on the outboard side indicating 
that substantial soil movement was occurring. 
Construction was not stopped after the indica-
tions of soil movement were noticed. Driving of 
the piles in Rows A through D started on 
March 16 beginning at Line 18 and proceeding 
east. The piles were driven at a rate of about 
25 piles every two days. By March 26, the Row C 
and D piles from Line 18 to 42 and the A and B 
piles from Line 18 to 37 had been driven. 
During the pile driving, the cracking in E and F 
piles became more severe, and construction was 
stopped on March 26. 
The major area of pile cracking was from about 
Line 27 to Line 43. In this area the Row E 
piles had cracks up to about l-in. wide and some 
were severely spalled exposing the reinforcing 
steel. The Row F piles in this area had cracks 
ranging from hairline to about 1/4-in. wide. 
The Row E and F piles had rotated significantly 
toward the outboard about the top of the piles. 
Some of theE and F piles between Line 44 and 51, 
had hairline cracks. 
Figure 5 shows the as-built slope geometry at 
Line 35. The top of the riprap was at about 
El 5 MLW rather than El 1 MLW. In addition, the 
dredged slope was steeper than the design slope, 
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Fig. 5 As-built Cross Section at Line 35 
especially near the toe, and was dredged to 
about El -36 MLW rather than El -35 MLW. 
After construction was stopped, three slope 
inclinometers were installed, two in the failure 
zone at Line 35 and one outside the failure zone 
at Line 44. The locations of the two inclinom-
eters at Line 35 are shown on the cross section 
in Fig. 5, along with movements measured at the 
inclinometer locations. 
As shown in Fig. 5, the inclinometer measure-
ments indicated that a deep-seated slope failure 
was occurring through the silty clay in the out-
board slope. It should be noted that a much 
larger amount of movement occurred before the 
inclinometers were installed. 
At the time in early March when the cracking was 
first noticed and in late March when the 
cracking became more severe, the river reached 
about El -1.5 MLW (1.5 below mean low water) at 
low tide. The inclinometers also showed large 
amounts of movement during subsequent lower low 
tide cycles. 
ANALYSIS OF FAILURE 
After the construction was stopped, the designer 
performed a series of borings to investigate the 
cause of the failure. The locations of the 
borings performed in the vicinity of the out-
board slope are shown in Fig. 1. UU triaxial 
tests were performed on undisturbed samples 
obtained in the borings. The results of the UU 
tests performed on samples of the silty clay 
from the borings located outboard of the 
bulkhead are plotted in Fig. 6. Figure 6a shows 
the results for the borings performed within the 
failure zone and Fig. 6b shows the results for 
the borings located outside the failure zone. 
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There is no evident difference in the two 
strength profiles. By comparison with Fig. 3, 
it can be seen that the strength profiles shown 
in Fig. 6 are similar to the strength profile 
measured during the design phase. 
Stability analyses were performed to evaluate 
possible causes for the failure. Analyses were 
first performed to determine the effect of 
placing the riprap to El 5 MLW and dredging the 
slope to a steeper slope and slightly deeper 
depth than designed. The river was assumed to 
be at El -1.5 MLW. The strength profile used in 
the analyses was based on the profile shown in 
Fig. 6a and was the same used to analyze the 
design slope geometry. In the first analysis, 
it was assumed that the riprap was placed to El 
5 MLW, but the slope was at the design 2H:lV. 
The computed factor of safety for this case was 
about 1.45 as compared to 1.8 computed for the 
design geometry. Next, the stability was ana-
lyzed for the as-built geometry with the riprap 
to El 5 MLW and the slope dredged steeper and to 
El -36 MLW as shown in Fig. 5. The computed 
factor of safety for this case was about 1.25. 
These results indicate that the excess riprap 
and overdredging significantly reduced the fac-
tor of safety and increased the shear stresses 
in the outboard slope. Since the factor of 
safety was greater than 1.0 based on the peak 
strengths, the strength of the silty clay must 
have been reduced in the shear zone for the 
failure to have occurred. The method of 
dredging which resulted in a near-vertical face 
after the berthing area was dredged and the sub-
sequent pile driving probably caused zones of 
disturbed silty clay with reduced shear 
strength, especially near the toe of the slope. 
As a result, the average shear strength along 
the failure zone was reduced below the average 
peak strength. 
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 

























































































Fig. 6 Silty Clay Undrained Strength Profile from UU Tests Performed 
After Failure - a) Within Failure Area, b) Outside Failure Area 
Analyses were next performed to determine the 
average value of shear strength required along 
the failure surface in the silty clay for the 
factor of safety to equal 1.0. The results 
indicated that an average value of about 400 psf 
was required. 
The strengths measured in the borings within the 
failure zone (Fig. 6a) are generally greater 
than 400 psf. However, these borings were all 
performed at about Row E. No borings were per-
formed between Rows E and A where the potential 
for disturbance of the silty clay was the 
highest due to dredging and pile driving. To 
evaluate the effect of the sensitivity of the 
silty clay on the stability of the slope, the 
post-peak strength measured at 10% strain in 
each of the UU tests was determined and plotted 
in Fig. 7. The shear strength at 10% strain was 
676 
about 400 psf from about El -20 to El -40 MLW 
and slightly higher above and below. this zone. 
An analysis was performed assuming the clay out-
board of Row E had been disturbed to the degree 
that the strength could be represented by the 
profile shown in Fig. 7. The computed factor of 
safety for this case was about 1.10. Localized 
zones in the silty clay, especially at the toe 
of the slope and surrounding the piles, would be 
probably more disturbed with a lower strength in 
which case the factor of safety would be closer 
to 1. 0. 
Based on the review of the failure, it is felt 
that the failure occurred as a progressive 
failure caused by disturbance of the silty clay 
during construction. The following factors pro-
bably contributed to the disturbance of the 
silty clay and the progressive failure. 
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Fig. 7 Silty Clay Strength Profile at 10% 
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1) Sensitivity of the Silty Clay -The silty 
clay is highly sensitive as evidenced by the 
shape of the stress-strain curves and its 
high sensitivity makes the silty clay highly 
susceptible to disturbance and significant 
reduction in strength. 
2) Placement of Riprap Above Design Elevation -
Placing the riprap to El 5 to 7 MLW rather 
than El 1 MLW increased the driving force 
and shear stresses in the slope and 
increased the chances for a progressive 
failure. 
3) Dredging -When the slope was dredged, the 
silty clay near the toe of the slope was 
unloaded significantly. The shear strength 
of the silty clay will reduce somewhat as it 
swells under the lower confining stress. 
The main effect of dredging on the stability 
of the slope was the method of dredging. 
The berthing area was dredged to El -35 MLW 
first, leaving a near vertical slope at the 
location of the toe of the design slope. 
The shear stresses and resulting strains 
were probably very high near the toe of the 
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slope causing a significant 
strength in the area at the 
tion, the slope was dredged 
a slighly deeper depth than 
reduction in the 
toe. In addi-
steeper, and to 
designed'. 
4) Pile Driving - Even though the piles were 
driven 12 ft and 16 ft on-center the pile 
driving probably caused disturbance in the 
silty clay. The disturbance may have been 
confined to small areas around the piles but 
may have resulted in very low strengths in 
these areas. These areas of low strength 
would have lowered the average shear 
strength along the failure surface and 
increased the chance of progressive 
failures. 
5) 
The effect of pile driving on the stability 
of the slope was evidenced during the 
driving of the remaining deck piles and the 
replacement piles for the damaged piles 
after the wharf was redesigned. As part of 
the required redesign, the crest of the out-
board slope was excavated to El -5 MLW 
before the piles were qriven. Movements of 
the slope were monitored during pile driving 
using slope inclinometer and tape exten-
someter measurements. The piles were 
installed at a controlled rate of 5 to 8 
piles per day. Even with these precautions, 
about 1.3 inches of slope movement occurred 
during pile driving. This movement reflects 
the sensitivity of the silty clay and the 
effect pile driving had on the failure 
during which the piles were driven at a rate 
of about 25 piles every two days. 
Sequence of Construction - The piles in 
Rows A through D were driven very soon after 
the slope was dredged, even though slope 
movement and cracking of the Row E and F 
piles was observed during dredging. If pile 
driving had been delayed and the cause of 
the movement investigated, damage to the 
piles may have been reduced, and it may have 
been possible to implement remedial 
measures. 
The slope failure at Merrill Marine Terminal 
illustrates that the designers must consider the 
sensitivity and the shape of the stress-strain 
curves of the soils when designing a project. 
For soils exhibiting peaked stress strain curves 
with subsequent dropoff in shear strength, 
applying a generally accepted factor of safety 
to the peak strength may not insure that there 
will not be a slope failure. As evidenced at 
the subject site, construction techniques can 
cause sufficient shear strains to result in the 
soils locally to have a significantly reduced 
strength. If the locally reduced strength 
causes the average shearing resistance along a 
potential failure plane to equal the driving 
shear stresses, failure can occur. As a result, 
the designer should estimate during design the 
reduced shear strength the soils may reach 
during or after construction. The factor of 
safety selected for design should reflect the 
strength used in the analysis, the shape of the 
strength vs strain curve, and the potential for 
disturbance during construction. 
The slope failure at the subject site also 
illustrates that monitoring and control of 
construction is especially important when 
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dealing with sensitive soils. An instrumen-
tation system should be designed to reflect 
potential movements during construction, and a 
plan of action should be available should the 
instruments indicate larger than expected move-
ments. The contractor and the owner should 
understand the implications of the instruments 
showing unexpected readings. For example, it 
should be understood that construction may stop 
in the area where unexpected movement has taken 
place. If this issue is carefully explained in 
the specifications and during construction 
sequencing, potential conflicts over claimed 
construction delays may be avoided. After move-
ments were observed at the west 200 ft section 
of the wharf and during the early stages of 
dredging of the remaining 400 ft, construction 
should have stopped and the cause of the move-
ments evaluated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The major factors that contributed to the 
failure of the outboard slope were: 
1) Not recognizing the importance on design of 
the high sensitivity of the silty clay. 
2) Placement of riprap on the crest of the 
slope to 4 to 6 ft above the design eleva-
tion. 
3) The method of dredging which resulted in 
high shear stresses at the toe of the slope 
and, as a result, probable zones of 
disturbed clay with significantly lower 
shear strength than the strength used in the 
stability analysis. 
4) Local zones of disturbance and low strength 
in the silty clay caused by driving full 
displacement piles through the slope. 
5) Permitting construction to continue very 
soon after the slope was dredged, even 
though slope movements and cracking of piles 
was observed during dredging. 
Although several factors contributed to the 
slope failure, the authors feel that the main 
reasons for the failure was a lack of appre-
ciation of the high sensitivity of the silty 
clay and a lack of construction control. The 
engineer should consider the sensitivity and the 
shape of the stress-strain curve of the soils 
when designing a slope or any other structure. 
In sensitive soils, the construction must be 
closely monitored and controlled to avoid or 
detect potential problems and implement remedial 
measures to correct problems if they occur. 
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